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EMERGENCY REMOVALS WITHOUT A COURT ORDER:
USING THE LANGUAGE OF EMERGENCY TO DUCK
DUE PROCESS
Jane Brennan*
For a brief moment during the recent September democratic
presidential debate, the ugly underbelly of the child welfare system
unexpectedly took center stage. When asked about what
responsibility Americans need to take to repair the legacy of slavery,
the former vice president responded by propagating a myth that
Black parents do not know how to parent.1 Former Vice President
Joe Biden said “[w]e bring social workers into homes and parents
to help them deal with how to raise their children. It’s not that they
don’t want to help. They don’t—they don’t know quite what to do.”2
What exactly is it that these Black parents do not know to do? More
importantly, why is this a justification for interference with a
family? This statement and sentiment highlights the ways in which
the child welfare system was designed, and the racist assumptions
and myths that allow it to continue operating.3 Dorothy Roberts, a
* J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 2020; B.A., Columbia University, 2010. Many
thanks to the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for your thoughtful
editing and guidance.
1 Charles M. Blow, Joe Biden Is Problematic, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/opinion/joe-biden.html.
2 Id.
3 “One hundred years from now, today’s child welfare system will surely be
condemned as a racist institution. . . . School children will marvel that so many
scholars and politicians defended this devastation of Black families in the name
of protecting Black children. The color of America’s child welfare system is the
reason Americans have tolerated its destructiveness.” DOROTHY ROBERTS,
SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE IX-X (2002); see also
Dorothy Roberts & Lisa Sangoi, Black Families Matter: How the Child Welfare
System Punishes Poor Families of Color, THE APPEAL (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://theappeal.org/black-families-matter-how-the-child-welfare-system-
punishes-poor-families-of-color-33ad20e2882e/.
122 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
law professor who has studied foster care systems in the United
States and its effects on Black family notes, “[i]f you go into
dependency court in Chicago, New York, or Los Angeles without
any preconceptions, you might conclude that the child welfare
system is designed to monitor, regulate and punish Black mothers.”4
Given the widespread inequities built into state organized child
welfare systems, revising existing federal law is the most efficient,
short-term solution to ensure that children are not unnecessarily
removed from their families.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine it is the middle of the night and you are fast asleep in
your bed. Suddenly, you are jolted awake by a loud knock on your
front door. Half asleep and slightly disoriented, you roll out of bed
and make your way to the source of the noise. Cautiously, you open
the door to find a child protective worker standing before you. You
are confused.5
The child protective worker explains that she has arrived to
investigate a report of child abuse and neglect. Someone—she will
not tell you who—made a report about you to the Statewide Central
Register.6 She inspects your apartment for food, sleeping
arrangements, cleanliness, smoke detectors, and window guards.
She questions your children. She then removes their clothes to
4 Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of
Black Mothers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1483 (2012).
5 This hypothetical fact pattern is presented for purposes of illustration. It is
a practice that occurs in New York City. While state agencies differ across
geographical areas, the process of emergency removals looks similar across the
country. See generally Kathryn Joyce, The Crime of Parenting While Poor, THE
NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 25, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/153062/crime-
parenting-poor-new-york-city-child-welfare-agency-reform.
6 The Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment receives
telephone calls 24 hours a day for reports alleging child abuse or maltreatment
within New York State. Information reported to the Statewide Central Register is
given to the local child protective agency for investigation. Both mandated
reporters and the public can call in to report allegations. The Statewide Central
Register of Child Abuse and Mistreatment, OFF. OF CHILD. AND FAM. SERVS.,
https://ocfs.ny.gov/main/cps/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
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examine them for marks and bruises.7 She asks you questions about
your mental health, drug use, and your intimate relationships.8 You
are still confused and unsure about what is happening, when the next
thing you know, your child is being led away, taken from your
custody by a stranger—who happens to be a state agency official.
The child protective worker tells you something about coming to
court the following day, a child safety conference,9 and parenting
classes.10 Unceremoniously, she gives you some paperwork and
quickly departs.
This is not an uncommon situation, especially in poor
communities of color.11 There is ample research documenting the
7 See What You Need to Know About ACS: Parents Rights when Dealing with
the NYC Administration for Children’s Services, CTR. FOR URB. PEDAGOGY,
http://welcometocup.org/file_columns/0000/1747/cup_mpp_acs_finalmech_201
90412_fromcup_webready.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (describing what an
Administration for Children’s Services’ (“ACS”) investigation may look like and
what questions ACS will ask during an investigation).
8 ACS investigators often do not look official but do need to carry an ID.
You do not have to open the door for an ACS investigator unless she or he has a
warrant. You can also refuse to speak to the ACS investigator. However, few
people understand that anything they say or their reaction to an ACS investigation
may later be used in court or even as a basis for the petition asking for the removal
of a child. See id.
9 A child safety conference is a meeting facilitated by the child protective
agent and the parents where important decisions are made about the children.
Lawyers cannot attend child safety conferences, but a social worker or parent
advocate may attend if a parent has the resources to contact someone prior to the
conference. Although a social worker or parent advocate may attend a child safety
conference if a parent has the resources to contact someone prior to the
conference, lawyers cannot attend. This leaves parents to attend these child safety
conferences without legal representation. Anything said or observed at the
conferences, as well as the child protective agency’s investigation, can be used
against a parent in court and as a basis for removal of the children from the home.
See id. (explaining a child safety conference).
10 A service plan responds to the issues that caused ACS to file the case, and
completion of a service plan is an important factor in concluding a case in family
court either by trial or settlement. Service plans may include anger management
classes, parenting classes, drug tests, etc. See id. (explaining a service plan).
11 Yasmeen Khan, Family Separations in Our Midst, WYNC (Apr. 17,
2019), https://www.wnyc.org/story/child-removals-emergency-powers/.
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racial disproportionality and disparity in the child welfare system.12
When children are removed on an emergency basis, they are often
taken from their families with no warning and subjected to extensive
questioning, medical exams, and strip searches.13 These emergency
removals, which are often conducted in the middle of the night,14 are
typically based on the report of a mandated reporter, such as a school
teacher.15 However, any member of the public can report allegations
of child mistreatment to prompt an investigation.16 The number of
reports that do not rise to the level of abuse or neglect is staggering.17
There is little protection against malicious reporting,18 despite the
fact that removal of a child from his or her home—and family—is a
traumatic experience for children, parents, and the family unit.19
The effects of child abuse can be devastating. By and large,
however, the current child welfare system does not adequately
help—or even identify—children who have been abused, and
instead inflicts harm onto the families it should be assisting.
Ultimately, the child welfare system fails to protect children because
it fails to support families.20
12 See generally Racial Disproportionality and Disparity in Child Welfare,
CHILDS. BUREAU (Nov. 2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs
/racial_disproportionality.pdf (summarizing research documenting the
overrepresentation of African Americans and Native Americans in the child
welfare system).
13 See Conor Friedersdorf, In a Year, Child-Protective Services Checked Up
on 3.2 Million Children, THE ATLANTIC (July 22, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/07/in-a-year-child-
protective-services-conducted-32-million-investigations/374809.
14 See Joyce, supra note 5.
15 Child Maltreatment 2018: Summary of Key Findings, CHILDS. BUREAU,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/canstats.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
16 Id.
17 See Child Maltreatment 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 6–
8, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2017.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2020).
18 Rachel Blustain, False Abuse Reports Trouble Child Welfare Advocates,
CITY LIMITS (Oct. 4, 2013), https://citylimits.org/2013/10/04/false-abuse-reports-
trouble-child-welfare-advocates/.
19 See Friedersdorf, supra note 13.
20 Tom Morton, The Pernicious Failure of Child Welfare Reform, THE
IMPRINT (Nov. 21, 2017), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/child-welfare-
2/pernicious-failure-child-welfare-reform/28708.
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Nationwide, child welfare agencies lack evidence-based policies
and procedures, provide inadequate training, and require insufficient
professional qualifications from the caseworkers empowered to
decide whether or not to remove a child.21 These shortcomings have
paved the way for paternalist viewpoints, like those expressed by the
former vice president on the debate stage,22 structuring a racist and
oppressive child welfare system.23 Insidious biases give rise to the
presumption that Black and Brown people are bad parents and that
their children are safer in the hands of the state.24 Subsequently,
shortcomings in child welfare agencies have set up the system to
fail.25 Frequently, the child welfare system does not serve a family’s
or a child’s best interests because far too often it relies on the
unnecessary emergency removal of children from their families.26
Despite the deployment of well-meaning rhetoric about the need to
prioritize keeping families together, unauthorized and unnecessary
emergency removals continue to happen daily.27
Overzealous removals harm children and the family unit alike,
and are far too often the default policy when a child’s welfare is
threatened.28 The Department of Health and Human Services
typically publishes annual statistics on the work of child protective
service agencies, but notably, there is little data concerning the
number of kids removed from their parents, even temporarily, who
are then returned after investigators find no evidence of
maltreatment.29 “Maltreatment” refers to the four predominate
21 Id.
22 Blow, supra note 1.
23 Asia Piña, Defending Families Facing Child Removal, DOIN’ THE WORK
(Sept. 2, 2019), https://dointhework.podbean.com/e/defending-families-facing-
child-removal-asia-pina-msw.
24 Id.
25 Morton, supra note 20.
26 Khan, supra note 11.
27 About ACS, NYC CHILDREN, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/acs/about
/about.page (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
28 See Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of
International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 276 (2003) (describing a lawsuit
challenging ACS’s policy of automatically removing children from homes where
domestic violence had occurred).
29 See Friedersdorf, supra note 13; see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., supra note 17.
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categories recognized by the majority of states: neglect, physical
abuse, sexual abuse, and a catch-all “other” category, which can
include “threatened abuse or neglect, drug/alcohol addiction,” “lack
of supervision,” or any other form of maltreatment a state wishes to
include.30 The most recent statistic, released in 2012, showed that
more than 100,000 children who were removed in 2001 were
subsequently found not to have been maltreated.31 The number
accounts for one in three children who were removed from their
families in 2001.32 Nationally, an average of about 700 children
every day are removed from the custody of their parents based on
allegations of abuse or neglect.33 The vast percentage of cases
prompting removal allege neglect rather than abuse,34 and many of
those cases are complicated by issues related to poverty.35
What constitutes an acceptable justification for an emergency
removal depends entirely on jurisdiction. The circuit courts are
divided on the question of whether or not child protective services,
where it is shown the agency could reasonably have obtained an
order prior to removal, may remove a child from their home without
such a court order.36Additionally, even in states where emergency
removals are permitted by law to be employed only in response to
emergency situations, in practice, this is not the case.37 This is due
30 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &HUM. SERVS., supra note 17, at vii.
31 Friedersdorf, supra note 13.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 While national data is not available, small samplings of data show this to
be true. See Lauren Shapiro, Dir. of the Fam. Def. Prac., Brooklyn Def. Servs.,
Remarks before the N.Y.C. Council on Removals from Parents and Caretakers in
Child Welfare Cases (Nov. 27, 2018) (transcript available on the Brooklyn
Defender Service’s webpage) (“Over 90 percent of [BDS] clients are charged with
allegations of neglect, rather than abuse.”).
35 Id.
36 See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 594-5 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that if there is time to seek a court order, child protective services must do so prior
to removal); c.f. Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting the Second Circuit’s holding that the focus should be on whether or not
there is time to obtain a court order).
37 See Shapiro, supra note 34. (noting that in Brooklyn, New York, where
the law permits child protective services to remove children without a court order,
only in an emergency situation—when the danger to a child is so serious and so
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in large part to vague child neglect and abuse statutes that grant wide
swaths of discretion to social workers, which in turn invites bias and
imprecise, inconsistent determinations of what constitutes an
“emergency.”38 Though the government’s interest in removing
children is ostensibly rooted in protecting them from harm, the
strategy often has the opposite impact, generating traumatic
experiences due to unnecessary removals. 39 Thus, states should
consider the undisputed harm of removing a child from his or her
natural home against the harm it invokes as a rationale for removal.40
Part I of this Note examines the longstanding reciprocal right of
parents and children to maintain their family integrity as a
fundamental liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part I also discusses the qualified
nature of this fundamental liberty; particularly, how the states’
interest in protecting children from abuse and neglect allows for
certain regulations and intrusions on this right. Emergency
removals, for example, are one of the most direct manifestations of
the states’ parens patriae power.41 Part II describes the current laws
regulating emergency removals, examining interactions between
state and federal statutory law as well as constitutional issues raised
by these proceedings. Part II then analyzes the current circuit split
regarding when emergency removals are constitutionally
authorized, and in particular, when removals are permitted without
a court order. Part III considers the harm children suffer when
immediate that there is no time to go to court—is it “common for Family Court
Judges to refuse to decide an application for removal, instead scheduling the case
for a hearing the next day and telling the parties that “[child protective services]
has its emergency removal powers”).
38 See Michelle Goldberg, Has Child Protective Services Gone Too Far?,
THE NATION (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/has-child-
protective-services-gone-too-far/.
39 See infra part III (addressing the harms of removal).
40 Vivek Sankaran & Christopher Church, Easy Come, Easy Go: The Plight
of Children Who Spend Less Than 30 Days in Foster Care, 19 U. PA. J. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 207, 237 (2016) (“[T]he federal government must acknowledge the
problem of short stayers by utilizing data related to children who may
unnecessarily enter foster care in the Child and Family Services Review, the
accountability process used to assess state compliance with federal child welfare
requirements.”).
41 See infra part I (addressing the state’s parens patriae power).
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removed from their parents and homes, synthesizing social science
research and the realities of the child welfare system to demonstrate
the grave damage unnecessary removals and intrusions on family
integrity cause. Finally, Part IV proposes codifying the narrowest
emergency removal exception as federal law. This section provides
an overview of the unique ways federal funding of the child welfare
system allows the federal government to influence nationwide
policy changes within state child protective agencies. The proposed
narrow emergency removal exception will appropriately restrict
state child protective practices, authorizing caseworkers to make
removals only in truly exigent circumstances. This change in the law
would counteract the harmful trends and tendencies of the child
welfare system primarily by minimizing individual caseworker
discretion, thus ensuring children and families are not harmed by
emergency removals—a drastic form of family intervention that is
too frequently employed without justification.
I. THE RIGHT TO FAMILY INTEGRITY IS A FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. History of the Right to Family Integrity
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that
no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”42 Beginning in the early 1900s, the
Supreme Court started incorporating specific provisions enumerated
in the Bill of Rights into the “liberties” protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 But this incorporation was
merely a starting point. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme
Court recognized that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
43 See generally Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (locating the right to
contract and economic liberates in the fourteenth amendment’s due process
clause); Adkins v. Childs. Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a minimum
wage law as an infringement on economic liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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give them life and substance.”44 These rights located in the
“penumbras” also enjoyed protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.45 Over time, the Supreme Court has also located and
incorporated a number of fundamental liberty interests beyond those
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, within the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause, including the right to privacy, as
recognized in Roe v. Wade.46
The right to family integrity is one of the oldest and perhaps
strongest fundamental liberty interests protected in American
jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.47 The Supreme Court reaffirmed, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,
that “[c]hoices about family life,” and the rights of parents to raise
their children, are rights of “basic importance in our society.”48
These rights, the court wrote, are to be protected from “the State’s
unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.”49 Similarly,
family unity,50 and the “private realm of family life,”51 have also
long been protected from the encroachment of the state by the
44 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
45 Id. at 484.
46 See generally id. (protecting the possession and use of contraception under
the due process clause); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (protecting the right
to abortion under the due process clause); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (protecting the right to live as an untraditional family under
the due process clause); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (protecting the
right to sexual intimacy under the due process clause); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. 644 (2015) (protecting the right to same sex marriage under the due process
clause).
47 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”); seeWisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.”).
48 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996).
49 Id.
50 See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (“This right
to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the reciprocal rights of both
parent and children.”).
51 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
130 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.52 In 1923, the
Supreme Court held in Meyer v. State of Nebraska that there was a
constitutionally protected right of parents to “establish a home and
bring up children.”53 Meyer overturned a Nebraska law that made it
a crime for a teacher to “teach any subject to any person in any
language other than the English language.”54 In reversing the
conviction of a teacher who violated the law, the court held that the
Due Process Clause protected “the power of parents to control the
education of their own [children].”55 Two years later, in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, the court similarly upheld a parent’s right to
provide their children with religious schooling, thereby striking
down an Oregon state law mandating attendance in public school.56
In 1977, inMoore v. City of E. Cleveland, Justice Powell located the
constitutional protection of the “sanctity of the family,” finding that
the family unit is “deeply rooted” in the United States’ history and
is the institution through which our country’s morals, cultures, and
traditions are passed down to subsequent generations.57
Most recently, in 2000, the Supreme Court reaffirmed these
rights in Troxel v. Granville, holding that, “[i]n light of this
extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process
52 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66; Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (establishing the rights “to marry, establish a home and bring up
children . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”); see,
e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (“[B]because the Bill of
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and
preservation of [the family] a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified
interference by the State.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that the Ninth Amendment protects
“fundamental personal rights” such as the right to raise a family, even “though [it
is] not specifically mentioned in the Constitution”).
53 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
54 Id. at 397.
55 Id. at 401.
56 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only.”).
57 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (“[T]he
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. It
is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural.”).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children.”58
The right to family integrity should be conceptualized as a dual
right of parents and children59—that is, a parent’s right to “the care,
custody, and nurture” of their children,60 and a child’s right to be
raised by their parent at home.61 The 1989 Convention on the Rights
of the Child describes the family “as the fundamental group of
society,” maintaining that the family best promotes the “growth and
well-being” of all members of society, especially children.62 The
Convention boasts 196 member-states, evidencing the international
community’s recognition of the central role of family integrity in
promoting healthy children.63
Even when the bonds between child and parents are strained, the
parents retain a natural interest in their family structure.64 The long-
established right to family integrity recognizes the intrinsic value of
family bonds and relationships.65 Social science has also
documented the importance of the family unit on a child’s
58 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
59 Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (“This right to
the preservation of family integrity encompasses the reciprocal rights of both
parent and children.”).
60 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”).
61 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
62 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child preamble, Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious
development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment,
in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding).
63 Id. (noting that, currently, 196 countries are party to the Convention,
including every member of the United Nations except the United States).
64 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“Even when blood
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life.”).
65 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“[N]atural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”).
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wellbeing,66 as well as the profound harm caused by removing
children from their parents—even when the separation is only
temporarily.67
The strong liberty interests of the family unit are not absolute
and this Note does not endeavor to make that argument.68 The
Courts have never held that the family unit is beyond state regulation
when there exists a compelling government interest for such
regulation.69 There are situations where the state may exercise
regulatory power, acting as a so-called parens patriae,70 to take
custody of children who have been abused or neglected.71 This
power arises when the circumstances are deemed too dangerous for
a child to remain at home.72 However, these extreme intrusions into
the family unit, especially when children are removed from their
parents, should be the exception, not routine practice.73
The reality, however, is that the fundamental right to family
integrity is routinely violated.74 Far too frequently, a state seeks
removal—the most extreme and damaging of solutions—only to
66 See Parenting Matters: Supporting Parents of Children Ages 0–8, NAT’L
ACAD. PRESS, https://www.nap.edu/read/21868/chapter/2 (last visited Oct. 7,
2020).
67 Children’s Rights Litigation Committee of the American Bar Association
Section of Litigation, Trauma Caused by Separation of Children from Parents A
Tool to Help Lawyers, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/publications/litigation_committees/childrights/child-separation-memo
/parent-child-separation-trauma-memo.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2020); see also
discussion infra Part III.
68 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (holding that a state
power may limit parental freedom when the welfare of a child is affected).
69 Id.
70 Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The state
regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those
unable to care for themselves.”).
71 See Prince 321 U.S. at 166 (“But the family itself is not beyond regulation
in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. . . . And neither rights
of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the
general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae, may restrict the
parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the
child’s labor, and in many other ways.”).
72 Khan, supra note 11.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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correct this overreach a few weeks, or even months, later.75 This
trend is made even more troubling by the long, racist history of
family separations, unrelated to the safeguarding of children, that
has shaped this nation’s child protective services.76 The rhetoric of
saving children has often been the rallying cry of those seeking to
justify harmful practices that society routinely condemns in
retrospect.77 Accordingly, the need to scrutinize the reasons for state
intrusion into the family structure has a strong historical basis.78
B. Protections Afforded Parents Under the Fourteenth
Amendment
Fundamental liberty interests, such as the right to family
integrity, are afforded both substantive and procedural due process
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.79 Any law enacted
that encroaches on the fundamental right to family integrity would
likely need to be anchored by a compelling government interest.80
As mentioned, the state has a recognized interest in protecting the
health and safety of children.81 The right to family integrity and a
parent’s custody of their children has never been free from
75 Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Foster Care as
Punishment: The New Reality of ‘Jane Crow’, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/nyregion/foster-care-nyc-jane-crow.html.
76 Jeffery Robinson, America Was in the Business of Separating Families
Long Before Trump, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (July 6, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/america-was-business-separating-
families-long-trump.
77 Harmeet Kaur, Actually, the US Has a Long History of Separating
Families, CNN (June 24, 2018, 9:06 PM), https://www.cnn.com
/2018/06/24/us/us-long-history-of-separating-families-trnd/index.html.
78 Id.
79 See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1999) (analyzing
parents’ claims against a child protective agency alleging an illegal removal from
school on both procedural and substantive due process grounds).
80 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (Thomas, C., concurring)
(“The opinions of the plurality . . . recognize such a [fundamental] right [of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children], but curiously none of them
articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to
infringements of fundamental rights.”).
81 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1994).
134 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
government regulation particularly with regard to allegations of
abuse or neglect.82 State child welfare agencies may interfere,
regulate, and, when necessary, temporarily remove children from
the custody of their parents.83 In the most severe situations, such
agencies may seek to terminate a parent’s rights.84 However, a
natural parent’s liberty interest “in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their
child to the State.”85 The law recognizes that parents owe a “high
duty” to their children, but also presumes that the “natural bond”
that exists between parent and child causes parents to make
decisions in accordance with the best interests of their children.86
This “best interests of a child” standard is subjective, and thus any
state seeking to remove a child from his or her parent should be
prevented from doing so until there is a finding that a parent is
unfit.87 The constitutional cases discussing the presumption in favor
of parents’ determinations of what is in the best interest of their
children makes this clear.88
Procedurally speaking, due process typically requires that a
parent be provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard before
the state is permitted to deprive them of their right to the “care,
82 Id. (noting that the “rights of parenthood” are not “beyond limitation”).
83 See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (discussing the
appropriate standard of proof for termination of parental rights proceedings).
84 Id. at 747.
85 Id. at 753.
86 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“The law’s concept of the
family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”); see Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (“[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act
in the best interests of their children.”).
87 Vivek Sankaran, Let’s Be Honest: “Best Interest” Is in the Eye of the
Beholder, THE IMPRINT (Sept. 25, 2019, 4:31AM), https://imprintnews.org
/opinion/lets-be-honest-best-interest-is-in-the-eye-of-the-beholder/37784.
88 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 604; Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 86 (2000);
see also Sankaran, supra note 87 (arguing that the best interest of the child
standard is not an objective measure of truth but rather about who gets to make
decisions for the child—and that until proven unfit, a parent gets to decide).
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custody, and management of their children.”89 Thus generally, when
a state agency takes custody of a child, even temporarily, without
the consent of the child’s parents, a hearing before the court must be
held.90 Regardless, most states provide that caseworkers may
immediately remove a child, prior to any hearing, under emergency
circumstances.91 What constitutes emergency circumstances is
subject to debate between different states and different circuits.92
However, if a child protective agency has conducted an emergency
removal without a hearing, they must subsequently file a petition
with the court after the removal.93 The family court judge then
reviews the petition and circumstances around the emergency
removal and determines whether or not the child should be returned
to their parents.94
II. CURRENT LAWS CONCERNING EMERGENCY REMOVALS
Child welfare services and policies differ in each state. 95
However, since states largely rely on federal funding to maintain
89 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649–51 (1972); see also Robinson v. Via,
821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that due process “would generally
require a predeprivation hearing”).
90 See id. at 649 (“[A]ll Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a
hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody.”).
91 Child Abuse and Neglect, HELP GUIDE, https://www.helpguide.org
/articles/abuse/child-abuse-and-neglect.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
92 See Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2003)
(disagreeing with the Second Circuit’s holding that the focus should be on
whether or not there is time to obtain a court order).
93 See, e.g., id. (holding that Florida law requires a hearing within 24 hours
of state’s removal of children).
94 See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 850 (N.Y. 2004) (“In any
case involving abuse—or in any case where the child has already been removed
without a court order—the Family Court must hold a hearing as soon as
practicable after the filing of a petition, to determine whether the child’s interests
require protection pending a final order of disposition.”); Kearney, 329 F.3d at
1293 (likening a child’s removal to pretrial detention).
95 See How Federal Legislation Impacts Child Welfare Service Delivery,
CHILDS. BUREAU 1, 4 (July 2015), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs
/impacts.pdf (“The delivery of child protection and child welfare services to
individual citizens is primarily governed by State laws, regulations, and
policies/procedures.”).
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and operate their child welfare systems, federal legislative mandates
tied to that funding play a significant role in shaping state policies
and setting countrywide standards.96 Congress has enacted a series
of laws that have widely dictated the services and practices of state
child welfare agencies. For instance, the Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act (CAPTA), enacted on January 31, 1974, provides
funding for states to prevent, investigate, and prosecute child abuse
and neglect.97 States must follow mandatory guidelines under
CAPTA to receive federal funding,98 including those that prescribe
how they may respond to child abuse and neglect.99 CAPTA has
since been modified by a number of amendments in the 1990s and
2000s to reflect changing federal policies and priorities.100
The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), first enacted in
1997, lays out the current federal standard for removing a child from
his or her family.101 Under the Act, removal is permitted only when
“continuation in the home is contrary to the child’s welfare.”102
Child protective agencies are also required to make “reasonable
efforts” to prevent the unnecessary removal of children from their
homes, and to promote reunification.103 Acknowledging the harm to
children caused by removal, some states also require judges to
balance the harm of removal against the imminent risk to the child
remaining in the home, when deciding whether or not to remove a
child.104
96 Id.
97 About CAPTA: A Legislative History, CHILDS. BUREAU, https://
www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/about.pdf#page=2&view=Summary%20of%20
legislative%20history (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
98 Child Welfare Legislation, CFSR INFORMATION PORTAL, https://
training.cfsrportal.acf.hhs.gov/section-2-understanding-child-welfare-system
/2992 (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
99 Caroline T. Trost, Note, Chilling Child Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the
CAPTA Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 183, 201 (1998).
100 CHILDS. BUREAU, supra note 97.
101 See U.S. H. OF REP. COMM. ONWAYS ANDMEANS, GREENBOOK, CH. 11
CHILDWELFARE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (2011).
102 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–89, 111 Stat.
2115 (1997).
103 H.R. REP. NO. 96-900 at 4 (1980).
104 Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 852 (N.Y. 2004) (“[A] court
must weigh, in the factual setting before it, whether the imminent risk to the child
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The “reasonable efforts” standard underwent significant reform
in 1997 with the passage of the ASFA.105 Responding to critiques
that the prior federal standard for reasonable efforts, provided for by
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) in 1980,
did not adequately give guidance to state agencies about what
reasonable efforts were required, Congress revised this provision.106
While much of the language of the AACWA remained intact,107 the
reasonable efforts requirement was diluted by the addition of a
number of situations that excuse states from having to make
“reasonable efforts.”108 Thus, despite the revisions, the litany of
exceptions added under AFSA did little to provide uniform guidance
to courts or agencies in their application of the reasonable efforts
standard.109 Subsequent reforms continue to fail to adequately guide
state practice in promoting family integrity.110
Given the fundamental liberty interests involved with family
integrity, multiple constitutional issues arise when the state removes
a child from their parents.111 The Circuit Courts have all found that
the removal of a child suspected to be a victim of abuse or neglect
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and is subject to
protections under the Amendment’s Due Process clause.112
can be mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal. It must balance that risk
against the harm removal might bring, and it must determine factually which
course is in the child’s best interests.”).
105 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105–89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997)
106 Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s
Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259,
277 (2003).
107 See State Plan for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
671(a)(15)(B), (E) (mirroring language enacted in AFSA).
108 Crossley, supra note 106, at 257–58.
109 Id. at 282.
110 See id. (chronicling how child welfare legislation enacted at the federal
level affects state policy).
111 Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 509–10 (7th Cir. 2003); Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2d Cir. 1999); Rogers v. Cty. of San Joaquin., 487
F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1142 (9th Cir.
2000).
112 Heck, 327 F.3d at 509–10; Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 588; Rogers, 487 F.3d
at 1294; Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1136.
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However, there is disagreement amongst the Circuits as to the
appropriate level of due process protections that should apply during
emergency removals.
A. The Current Circuit Split Regarding Emergency
Removals Without a Court Order
The Supreme Court has made it clear that when a state intervenes
in the family unit and seeks to remove a child from the custody of
their natural parent, even temporarily, the Constitution requires the
family be heard at a pre-deprivation hearing.113 However, courts
have also acknowledged that there are circumstances where the
danger to a child may be immediate, where a state agency may
proceed prior to an ex parte order to effectuate a removal.114 This
practice is referred to as an “emergency” removal. Both federal and
state laws appear to authorize child protective staff, without a court
order (ex parte or otherwise), to effectuate the emergency removal
of a child from their home when a danger to that child is
imminent.115 There is conflict regarding when it is permissible for a
state agency to effectuate an emergency removal without a court
order.116 How and when this is allowed is entirely dependent on
113 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972); see also Robison v. Via,
821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that due process “would generally
require a predeprivation hearing”).
114 Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 606; Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1240
(10th Cir. 2003); Rogers, 487 F.3d at 1294; Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1294
(11th Cir. 2003).
115 Crossley, supra note 106, at 275.
116 See Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 594–95 (holding that if there is time to seek
a court order, child protective services must do so prior to removal); Roska, 328
F.3d at 1240–41 (holding that without “exigent” circumstances that the delay in
seeking a court order might have cost the child his life; the parents were deprived
of their pre-deprivation procedures); Rogers, 487 F.3d at 1297 (holding that child
protective services should have sought a court order before removing a child
where “the lack of exigency would have been apparent to any reasonable social
worker” and it would have only taken a short amount of time to seek a court
order); but see Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1298 (affording child protective services
wide discretion regarding when it is appropriate to execute an emergency
removal).
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which federal circuit governs the jurisdiction in question.117 Some
jurisdictions limit the emergency removal power to situations where
an imminent danger allows no time to seek a judicial order.118
Alternatively, other jurisdictions permit child protective agencies a
broadened emergency removal power.119
The U.S. Supreme Court has also highlighted the tension that
exists between a state’s interest in having an efficient procedure in
place to intervene when a child is endangered, and the importance
of preserving the liberty interests of families to be free from
unwanted state regulation and interference in their family unit.120 In
Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court affirmed the importance of
preserving the rights of parents to raise their children how they see
fit, overturning an Illinois law that required children of unwed
fathers to become wards of the state after the passing of their
mother.121 The state argued that the law avoided unnecessary
administrative procedures because unwed fathers are seldom fit
parents.122 In holding that, after the death of a child’s mother, and
before his children could be taken from him, a father was entitled to
a hearing regarding his fitness as a parent under the Due Process
Clause, Justice White wrote:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve
legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance
in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say
of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no
less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. Procedure by
117 Id.
118 See sources cited supra note 116.
119 See Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1295 (imparting great discretion to child
protective workers to determine when a removal could proceed without a court
order); see also Tower v. Leslie-Brown, 326 F.3d 290, 299 (1st Cir. 2003)
(conferring considerable discretion upon child protective workers in evaluating
when it is necessary to remove a child prior to court order).
120 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–57 (1972).
121 Id. at 657.
122 Id. at 647.
140 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the
determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly
disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it
needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of
both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.123
This tension between individual protections and efficient
procedure is apparent from the differing Circuit Court opinions on
the constitutionality of emergency removals without a judicial order.
The Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits find a narrow exception,
allowing emergency removals only when the exigency of the
circumstances are such that judicial review is not possible prior to
the child’s removal.124 A more discretionary approach, followed by
the First and Eleventh Circuits, grants child protective workers far
more leniency and flexibility in conducting emergency removals, so
long as they then come to court for a hearing within a reasonable
time after the removal has occurred.125 Current state laws also vary
widely, either defining the scope of emergency removals narrowly
or taking a more lenient approach.126
i. The Narrow Emergency Removal Exception
In Tenenbaum v. Williams, the Second Circuit reviewed whether
New York State’s unilateral removal of a child from her school for
medical examinations, based upon allegations of sexual abuse,
violated her parents’ due process rights.127 A caseworker had
removed the child from her kindergarten class without a court order
and without notifying or receiving consent from her parents.128
Despite the child protective agency’s knowledge, and supposed
concern, about the allegations of sexual abuse for at least several
123 Id. at 656–57.
124 Mark Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The
Constitutional Value of Pre-Deprivation Process, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 913, 914
(2004).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 917–18.
127 See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1999).
128 Id. at 591.
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business days prior, the removal occurred midday on a Tuesday
without court authorization.129
Given the allegations of sexual abuse, the court in Tenenbaum v.
Williams acknowledged that there are emergency situations where
removals must be conducted before seeking a court order to prevent
imminent harm to the child.130 The court stressed that this harmmust
be imminent, and that the “mere possibility of danger is not
enough.”131 However, the court also held that if “there is reasonably
sufficient time to seek prior judicial authorization, ex parte or
otherwise, for the child’s removal, then the circumstances are not
emergent.”132 It noted that the child protective agency had ample
time to obtain an order before effecting the removal, and that it
provided no rationale for not doing so.133
Tenenbaum is important, because if the court had held that
emergency removals were permitted even in situations where there
was time to obtain a judicial order, then state agencies could
effectuate all removals on an “emergency” basis, and parents would
be denied their due process right to a pre-deprivation hearing.134
Broadening the definition of “emergency” to allow for unilateral
removal without process essentially eviscerates the strong
constitutional right to family integrity protected under the Due
Process Clause.135
In dicta, the Tenenbaum Court acknowledged that a balance
must be struck so that the state may act promptly and efficiently to
protect children in “urgent situations,” but clarified that there is an
important difference between “necessary latitude and infinite
license.”136 It reasoned that if child protective workers were left to
believe that they could unilaterally remove children from their
homes without judicial review, it would inevitably lead to state
agencies inflicting harm on the children and families they are
129 Id. at 590–91.
130 Id. at 594.
131 Id. at 594 (quoting Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 1991)).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 595.
134 Id. at 594–95.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 595.
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charged to protect.137 Thus, the Second Circuit defined a narrow
exception, only allowing emergency removal without prior court
order when there is not enough time to obtain a court order and there
exists an imminent danger to the child’s health or life.138 The
standard sets a high bar, intended to make effectuating an
emergency removal without due process rare, at least on its face.139
Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits also seemingly follow the
central holding of Tenenbaum, holding that removal of a child
without judicial authorization is only permitted in cases where the
danger posed to the child’s life or health is so imminent that it does
not allow time to obtain a court order or warrant.140 In Roska v.
Peterson, the Tenth Circuit heard arguments from the parents of
twelve year old Rusty, alleging that Utah’s Division of Child and
Family Services deprived them of their right to due process by
removing Rusty from their care without a pre-deprivation
hearing.141 In reaching its decision, the court applied the same
standard it used for pre-deprivation hearings in termination of
parental rights proceedings, borrowed from Santosky v. Kamer,142 to
the temporary removal of children from custody.143 It acknowledged
that there are emergency circumstances that pose an immediate
137 Id. (“And as this case may demonstrate, if officers of the State come to
believe that they can never be questioned in a court of law for the manner in which
they remove a child from her ordinary care, custody and management, it is
inevitable that they will eventually inflict harm on the parents, the State, and the
child.” (emphasis in original)).
138 See id. at 596 (“[W]here there is reasonable time consistent with the safety
of the child to obtain a judicial order, the emergency removal of a child is
unwarranted.”).
139 Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
Tenenbaum held that “a social worker could not temporarily remove a child from
her parents’ custody without prior judicial authorization unless there was probable
cause to believe the child was in imminent danger of abuse and the social worker
reasonably determined there was insufficient time to obtain a court order before
removing the child from danger.”).
140 Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 594.
141 Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2003).
142 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (holding that the state must
prove its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence to comply with due
process standards).
143 Roska, 328 F.3d at 1245.
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threat to the safety of a child and that “might justify the absence of
pre-deprivation procedures.”144 However, there were no “exigent”
circumstances where the state’s evidence145 did not sufficiently lead
the court to believe that a delay to obtain a court order might have
cost the child his life.146 Thus, there were not “sufficient exigent
circumstances” to relieve Utah of its burden to obtain a court order
before carrying out the removal.147
About four years later, the Ninth Circuit decided Rogers v. City.
of San Joaquin, which similarly held that, absent conditions
presenting an “imminent risk of serious bodily harm,” removing
children from their home without obtaining judicial authorization is
a violation of a parent’s established Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.148 It found that the evidence presented after the
child’s removal149 to justify the caseworker’s failure to obtain a
warrant prior to the removal to be insufficient.150 Accepting San
Joaquin County’s version of the facts, the court acknowledged that
the children were in danger of long term harm if the parents did not
144 Id. at 1250.
145 Id. at 1240–41 (“After examining the record, we conclude that it contains
no evidence that could lead a reasonable state actor to conclude that there were
exigent circumstances. Although defendants at times assert that a delay to obtain
a warrant might have cost [the child] his life, the evidence shows otherwise.
Defendants were aware that various doctors had suspected that [the child] was a
victim of MSBP for quite some time, and the record indicates that there was
nothing particularly unusual about [the child’s] condition at the time he was
removed. [The child’s] attending physician stated on the phone that it would be a
mistake to remove him from the home.”).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1241.
148 Rogers v. Cty. of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1297–98 (9th Cir. 2007).
149 However, [the caseworker] does not assert that she believed that his
condition would worsen if she delayed taking him into custody in
order to obtain a warrant. [The child’s] teeth may have hurt, but, if
so, he had likely been experiencing such pain for a considerable
period of time and the pain was not so serious that he ceased to be
playful and alert. Under such circumstances, any pain [the child]
may have experienced cannot justify a failure to obtain a warrant or
the peremptory removal of the children from their parents’ custody.
Id. at 1295.
150 Id.
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modify their conduct within a “reasonable period of time.”151
However, in weighing the safety needs of the children against the
fundamental liberty interests of the parents, the Rogers Court
ultimately held that “the lack of exigency would have been apparent
to any reasonable social worker,” and that it would have only taken
a few hours to obtain a court order to remove the children should it
have been necessary.152
ii. The Discretionary Emergency Removal
Exception
Some circuits maintain that a due process standard for
emergency removals without prior court approval should be one that
affords case planners more discretion in removing children from
homes.153 The Eleventh Circuit made such a determination in Doe
v. Kearney. Kearney arose after the Florida Department of Children
and Family Services executed an “emergency” removal of the Doe
children without the parents’ permission and without a court
order.154 In reaching its decision, Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected
the standard articulated by the Second Circuit in Tenenbaum.155
Instead, it found that the state’s interest in protecting vulnerable
children allowed child protective workers more sweeping removal
powers,156 concluding that a parent’s due process rights were not
151 Id. at 1297.
152 Id. at 1298.
153 See Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 348 (4th Cir.1994) (“[C]onsiderable
deference must be accorded the delicate judgments made by responsible state
officials. Perhaps in no context is this truer than where the state is acting as parens
patriae to protect children from imminent danger.”); see also Wilkinson v.
Russel, 182 F.3d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing the “compelling governmental
interest in the protection of minor children, particularly in circumstances where
the protection is considered necessary as against the parents themselves.”).
154 Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
155 Id. at 1296–97.
156 Id. at 1295 (“[D]ue process is a flexible concept, and what procedures due
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well
as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.”).
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violated as long as a child protective worker has “reasonable
cause”157 to believe their child is in imminent danger.158
In its reasoning, the Kearney Court cited concerns about the
potential burdens of administrative procedures that would require
child welfare agencies to seek out a court order before removal. 159
It found that merely asking whether a child protective agency had
enough time to obtain a warrant was too simple an inquiry to fully
evaluate the liberty and safety interests at stake.160 Rather, the court
insisted that due process was a “flexible concept” that required a
careful balancing of those interests, including the fundamental
liberty interests of family integrity and the state’s interest in
protecting children.161 These interests “may be implicated to varying
degrees,” the court wrote, “depending on the facts of an individual
case, which will necessarily affect the degree of procedural due
process required.”162 In other words, the court imparted great
discretion to child protective workers to determine when a removal
could proceed without a court order.
The outcome in Kearney is unfortunate. After all, obtaining a
court order prior to removal will always require more administrative
work. The governmental interest in reducing that administrative
burden should always be outweighed when balanced against the
157 Here, the Court held that the following facts were sufficient to establish
reasonable cause of imminent harm:
[T]he record demonstrates that [the caseworker] responded
reasonably and swiftly as soon as she became aware of the
possible danger to the Doe children. . . . Here, [the caseworker]
investigated diligently and acted almost immediately after the
relevant facts came to her attention. At the same time, she did
not rush to judgment or react impulsively. Rather, she consulted
with both her supervisor and DCF legal counsel before taking
steps toward removing the Doe children. Even then, [the
caseworker] did not remove the children until after she
interviewed both the parents and children and determined the
children were unsafe.
Id. at 1298–99.
158 Id. at 1295.
159 Id. at 1297.
160 Id. at 1297–98.
161 Id. at 1297.
162 Id.
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fundamental liberty interests of family integrity.163 Further, this
discretionary approach essentially allows any reasonable risk of
harm to satisfy grounds for an emergency removal, thus gutting the
long-standing constitutional requirement of a pre-deprivation
hearing when the state seeks to intrude on family integrity.164 This
discretionary approach erases the defining aspects of the emergency
exception, instead rendering it moot and dismantling a parent’s due
process protections.165
The First Circuit also broadened the discretion of child
protective agents in Tower v. Leslie-Brown.166 In Tower, children
were removed from a mother’s care after their father was arrested.167
In justifying the removal, Maine’s Department of Human Services
alleged that the children’s mother would be unable to protect
them.168 The Tower Court acknowledged that, under ordinary
circumstances, due process entitled the family to notice and an
opportunity to be heard.169 However, the court held that removal
without a court order was permissible where there was a “reasonable
suspicion that abuse had occurred or that a threat of abuse was
imminent at the time of removal.”170 In such “extra-ordinary
situations,” the court wrote, “deprivation of a protected interest is
permitted without prior process.”171 The court went on to hold that
in “extra-ordinary situations,” adequate post-removal procedures,
such as holding a post-deprivation hearing three days after a
163 See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 595 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)) (“The establishment of prompt
efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest
worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.”).
164 See id. (holding that emergency removals can be effectuated without a
court order irrespective of whether there was time to seek a court order first).
165 See id. (locating a parent’s due process rights in the discretion of child
protective services rather than the courts).
166 Tower v. Leslie-Brown, 326 F.3d 290 (1st Cir. 2003).
167 Id. at 293–95.
168 Id. at 295.
169 Id. at 298.
170 Id.
171 Id. (quoting Suboh v. Dist. Att’y Off. of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 92 (1st Cir.
2002)).
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removal, satisfied the Due Process requirements.172 What the First
Circuit failed to explain, is what it meant by “extra-ordinary
situations.” By not defining this critical term, the decision in Tower
conferred considerable discretion upon child protective workers,
rendering its “reasonable suspicion” standard much broader than the
narrow exception for warrantless removals announced in
Tenenbaum v. Williams.173
III. THE HARM REMOVALS INFLICT ON CHILDREN
The psychological harm suffered by children separated from
their parents is well documented by social scientists.174 Over the past
few years, this harm has been acknowledged and articulated by
many Americans as an outrage, as President Trump’s immigration
practices and policies at the border have captured national attention
and widespread condemnation.175 However, the same concern and
attention about the harms children face when they are separated
from their families by the child welfare system remains largely
absent.176
The American Academy of Pediatrics warns that family
separations cause “irreparable harm” to children.177 Young children
who are exposed to traumatic events, such as separation from their
families and foster care, can suffer lasting impacts to their physical,
social, and psychological development into adulthood.178 The harm
of removal has lifelong impacts not just on those children
172 Id. at 299.
173 Id. at 298; Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 595 (2d Cir. 1999).
174 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 67.
175 Ginger Thompson, Listen to Children Who’ve Just Been Separated from
Their Parents at the Border, PROPUBLICA (June 18, 2018), https://
www.propublica.org/article/children-separated-from-parents-border-patrol-cbp-
trump-immigration-policy.
176 See Khan, supra note 11 (detailing the policy and practice of family
separations in New York City).
177 Thompson, supra note 166.
178 Stephanie Carnes, The Trauma of Family Separation Will Haunt Children
for Decades, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2018), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-carnes-family-separation-trauma_us
_5b2bf535e4b00295f15a96b2.
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permanently separated from their parents, but those children
temporarily separated.179 Clinical research shows that children who
are removed suffer adverse emotional effects such as “feelings of
abandonment, rejection, worthlessness, guilt, and helplessness.”180
Separations cause the release of stress hormones throughout the
brain and body that can lead to increased health risks such as heart
disease, hypertension, depression, obesity, and diabetes, and
increased likeliness of suicide attempts.181 In addition, children who
have been removed often suffer worse outcomes throughout their
life compared to those who were allowed to remain in a “marginal”
home.182 Separated children suffer a two to three times higher
179 See Delilah Bruskas, Children in Foster Care: A Vulnerable Population
at Risk, J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 70, 70 (2008)
(synthesizing foster care outcomes); Catherine R. Lawrence et al., The Impact of
Foster Care on Development, 18 DEVELOPMENT & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 57, 57–
59 (2006) (finding that children placed into stranger foster care showed higher
levels of internalizing problems compared with children reared by maltreating
caregivers).
180 Rosalind D. Folman, “I Was Tooken”: How Children Experience
Removal from Their Parents Preliminary to Placement in Foster Care, 2
ADOPTION QUARTERLY 7, 11 (1998).
181 See Sara Goydarzi, Separating Families May Cause Lifelong Health
Damage, SCI. AM. (June 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com
/article/separating-families-may-cause-lifelong-health-damage/ (documenting
the potential long term effects of family separations); see William Wan, What
Separation from Parents Does to Children: ‘The Effect is Catastrophic’, WASH.
POST (June 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/what-separation-from-parents-does-to-children-the-effect-is-
catastrophic/2018/06/18/c00c30ec-732c-11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html
(discussing the research on the effect of family separations on children in the
context of separations at the U.S.-Mexico border); see Carnes, supra note 178
(noting that exposure to traumatic events in childhood is strongly correlated with
increased risk of suicide attempts, drug addiction, depression, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, heart disease and liver disease); see Allison Eck,
Psychological Damage Inflicted by Parent-Child Separation is Deep, Long-
Lasting, NOVA NEXT (June 20, 2018), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next
/body/psychological-damage-inflicted-by-parent-child-separation-is-deep-long-
lasting.
182 See generally Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child Outcomes:
Measuring the Effects of Foster Care, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1583 (2007) (looking
at removal decisions that were “on the margins” and finding that children had
better long-term well-being outcomes if they remained at home).
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delinquency rate,183 are six times more likely to have behavioral
problems,184 and have higher teen birth rates.185 These adverse
effects continue into adulthood. Compared to children alleged to
have been maltreated who remain in the home, children who are
removed are more likely to have lower earnings as adults,186 are
more likely to have substance-related disorders and mental health
disorders,187 and are more likely to be arrested and have criminal
convictions for violent offenses.188 Given the irreparable harm
caused by separating families, child protective service ought to
prioritize minimizing removals of children and instead focus on
services that allow children to remain in the home.189
The effects of short term stays in foster care should be enough
to convince most that unnecessary emergency removals typically do
little more than magnify harm to children.190 One should consider
that the harm a child suffers as the result of being removed from
their natural home are usually compounded by the very real harms
that occur in an inadequate and substandard foster care system.191
183 Joseph P. Ryan & Mark F. Testa, Child Maltreatment and Juvenile
Delinquency: Investigating the Role of Placement and Placement Instability, 27
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 227, 243–44 (2005).
184 Kate Lowenstein, Shutting Down the Trauma to Prison Pipeline: Early,
Appropriate Care for Child-Welfare Involved Youth, CITIZENS FOR JUV. JUST.
(2018).
185 Doyle, Jr., supra note 182, at 1583.
186 Id.
187 Sylvana M. Côté et al., Out-of-Home Placement in Early Childhood and
Psychiatric Diagnoses and Criminal Convictions in Young Adulthood: A






189 See Sankaran & Church, supra note 40 (arguing that child welfare policy
should be one of “primum non nocere” or do no harm).
190 See id. (examining the long-term detrimental effects to children as a result
of short stays in foster care).
191 See id. The foster care system is designed to provide short-term care to
vulnerable children until the child can be returned to their home or placed
permanently with an adoptive family. In reality, children often remain in foster
care for prolonged periods of time. The longer a child remains in foster care the
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Many children are funneled into these systems, notwithstanding
statements like that of Arkansas’s state welfare agency, for example,
which admitted in a 2003 report that most fostered children in the
state “should have never come into care and instead should have
been served in the family home.”192
Despite the clear risks, some still argue that when it comes to
protecting a child, it is always better to err on the side of caution; in
other words, remove first, and ask questions later.193 But this
argument fails to address the realities of family courts. Families
separated by state intervention do not garner similar procedural
protections enjoyed by the criminal system.194 Once children are
removed, or a child welfare system is involved with a family, it may
take years to resolve a case. Mistakes are rarely corrected quickly
and can, in turn, retraumatize a child.195 Without stringent laws that
protect the right to family integrity, child welfare systems continue
to traumatize the very children they are charged to protect.196
Critics should also consider that the vast majority of child
protective cases arise out of circumstances of neglect, and although
it may be difficult to accept, it is the reality that the risk of
psychological harm due to removal almost always outweighs the
more likely she or he is to experience placement changes. These disruptions
impair a child’s, especially young children’s, social and emotional development.
This often results in long-term behavioral, mental health and educational
problems. Further, every placement change decreases the likelihood that a child
will achieve some type of permanency. Instead, many children get “stuck” in the
system and are discharged from foster care as young adults. These young adults
suffer disproportionally adverse outcomes when compared to other young adults.
See Lenette Azzi-Lessing, The Hidden Harms of the US Foster-Care System, THE
CONVERSATION (Jan. 22, 2016, 6:02 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-
hidden-harms-of-the-us-foster-care-system-49700 (discussing the “threats to the
safety and wellbeing of vulnerable children” in foster care).
192 Josh Gupta-Kagan, Towards a Public Health Legal Structure for Child
Welfare, 92 NEB. L. REV. 897, 916 (2014).
193 See Goldberg, supra note 38.
194 Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and
Neglect Cases Between Disposition and Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 13
(2010) (describing the lack of procedural protections afforded parents during trial
and the impact on a family’s ability to reunify successfully).
195 Id.
196 See id.
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risk of remaining in a parent’s care—even when that care is sub-
standard.197 Many child welfare experts argue that most cases of
neglect can be best served by preventive services, rather than
removals.198 In response to the growing awareness and research
associated with the harms of removal, federal policy must continue
to shift toward promoting preventative services and strengthening
families as ways to prevent unnecessary removals and thus mitigate
the harm to children and families.199
IV. REFORMING FEDERAL CHILDWELFARE LAWS TO ADOPT THE
TENENBAUMHOLDING PROVIDES THE BEST SOLUTION TO
REMEDY THE CIRCUIT SPLIT.
Revising existing federal law is the most effective and efficient
solution to ensure that children are not unnecessarily removed from
their families. The Circuit Courts remain divided on the issue of
emergency removals absent a court order—a split that the Supreme
Court likely will not resolve anytime soon.200 Codifying the
197 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 67.
198 See Doyle, Jr., supra note 182, at 1583 (looking at removal decisions that
were “on the margins” and finding that children had better long-term well-being
outcomes if they remained at home); see The Family First Prevention Services
Act: Historic Reforms to the Child Welfare System Will Improve Outcomes for
Vulnerable Children, CHILDS. DEF. FUND 1, 1–2 (Feb. 2018),
https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/family-first-
detailed-summary.pdf (lauding the passage of the Family First Prevention Service
Act for its reforms to help keep children safe with their families and minimizing
the traumas of entering foster care);
199 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. AND
FAMS., Information Memorandum, 18-05, at 1–3 (“The purpose of this
Information Memorandum (IM) is to strongly encourage all child welfare
agencies and Children’s Bureau (CB) grantees to work together with the courts
and other appropriate public and private agencies and partners to plan, implement
and maintain integrated primary prevention networks and approaches to
strengthen families and prevent maltreatment and the unnecessary removal of
children from their families.”).
200 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari to both Doe v. Kearney and
Tenenbaum v. Williams. City of New York v. Tenenbaum, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000)
(certiorari denied); Doe v. Reiger, 124 S. Ct. 389 (2003) (certiorari denied).
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Tenenbaum holding of the Second Circuit201 in a federal statute
advances both existing federal policy and ensures state practice
conforms to constitutional law designed to protect the liberty
interest of family integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment.202
Generally, child welfare services and policies can vary from
state to state.203 State legislatures enact state specific statutes and
state child welfare agencies create programs and policies tailored to
their specific jurisdictions and needs.204 Each state, however, relies
on federal dollars to help fund the care of a child while he or she is
in its custody, and while that child awaits a permanency plan.205 In
order to receive federal funds, a state and its child welfare agencies
must comply with federal child welfare requirements and
policies.206 In response to newly enacted Congressional legislation,
federal agencies such as the Children’s Bureau frequently enact
new, or update existing, federal mandates and regulations, and
advise individual state legislatures how to stay compliant with
changing federal laws by modifying their own laws and agency
policies.207 State child welfare agencies have been structured to be
responsive to federal mandates that are tied to funding.208 As such,
the federal government has a powerful ability to enact sweeping
201 Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 594–95 (holding that removal of a child without
judicial authorization is only permitted in cases where the danger posed to the
child’s life or health is so imminent that it does not allow time to obtain a court
order or warrant).
202 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty
interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the] Court.”).
203 See CHILDS. BUREAU, supra note 89 (“The delivery of child protection
and child welfare services to individual citizens is primarily governed by State
laws, regulations, and policies/procedures.”).
204 Id.
205 See Major Federal Legislation Concerned with Child Protection, Child
Welfare, and Adoption, CHILDS. BUREAU 1, 2, https://www.childwelfare.gov
/pubPDFs/majorfedlegis.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2020) (stating that permanency
usually results in either reunification with the child’s family or a permanent
placement in an adoptive family).
206 CHILDS. BUREAU, supra note 95.
207 Id.
208 See id. (detailing how federal funds influence child welfare systems and
service delivery).
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policy controlling how abuse and neglect allegations are dealt with
in every state.209
A great deal of federal funding supporting state child welfare
programs is authorized through Title IV-E and Title IV-B of the
Social Security Act (SSA).210 Title IV-B provides funding for the
prevention of, and response to, child abuse and neglect,211 while
Title IV-E provides funding, known as foster care maintenance
payments, for children who are in foster care until they are able to
be returned to their home or placed with a permanent adoptive
family.212
In 1980, when Congress passed the AACWA,213 Title IV-E
dollars were directed to support the foster care placement of a child
removed from his or her home only where a state agency had made
“reasonable efforts” to prevent the unnecessary removal of the child
from their home, and to promote reunification.214 In order to receive
federal Title IV-E funds, an agency had to meet two conditions. 215
First, a court had to determine that any removal was justified by a
finding that a child’s remaining in the home was contrary to the
welfare of that child.216 Second, the law required a state to make
“reasonable efforts” to prevent or eliminate the need for removing a
child from his or her home and family.217 A judge was required to
make a finding that “reasonable efforts” had been made by a state
agency in order for that state to receive Title IV-E funding for that
child.
In 1997, with the passage of the AFSA, the reasonable efforts
requirement was diluted by the addition of a number of specific
circumstances that excused states from having to make “reasonable
209 See CHILDS. BUREAU, supra note 205 (noting that states are required to
comply with certain federal requirements and policies in order to be eligible for
designated federal funding).
210 See id. (noting that Title IV-E and Title IV-B of the Social Security Act
are the largest federally funded programs that support child welfare programs).
211 42 U.S.C.A. § 621.
212 Id. § 672.
213 H.R. Rep No. 96-900 (1980).
214 Id.
215 42 U.S.C.A. § 672(a)(2)(A)(ii).
216 Id.
217 Id. § 671(a)(15).
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efforts.”218 Nonetheless, courts are still required to make a finding
regarding the second prong—whether the state made “reasonable
efforts” to prevent or eliminate the need for removing a child from
the home.219 The discretion given to courts—first under AACWA,
and continued under AFSA—in making the “reasonable efforts”
finding is potentially one of the most powerful tools to ensure that
child protective agencies first attempt to prevent a child’s removal
from their home before effectuating a removal.220
Linking Title IV-E federal funding to compliance with the
narrow exception for warrantless emergency removals, as
articulated in Tenenbaum, would help ensure that critical
constitutional protections for families and children are upheld in
every state.221 Furthermore, codifying specific “reasonable efforts”
factors to be considered by judges also addresses critiques that the
federal “reasonable efforts” provision is not a helpful guide for state
practice.222 This solution provides a necessary statutory floor to
prevent unnecessary removals. The reliance on federal funding to
advance policy goals and guidelines is undoubtedly limited.223
However, in the case where an emergency removal occurred without
a court order, a funding requirement that requires a court to make a
finding in each individual case has the potential to be a powerful
tool.224 In order for this incentive to be effective, courts will have to
218 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D).
219 Id. § 672.
220 Judge Leonard Edwards, Ignoring Reasonable Efforts: How Courts Fail
to Promote Prevention, THE IMPRINT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://imprintnews.org/top-
stories/ignoring-reasonable-efforts-why-court-system-fail-promote-
prevention/32974.
221 See CHILDS. BUREAU, supra note 205 (demonstrating how new federal
legislation also prompts responses at the state level, including enactment of state
legislation, development or revision of state agency policy and regulations, and
implementation of new programs).
222 See Crossley, supra note 106, at 277–78.
223 Vivek Sankaran, Rethinking Foster Care: Why Our Current Approach to
Child Welfare Has Failed, 73 SMU L. Rev. 12 (2020) (describing the lack of
“meaningful return” on federal funding to advance child welfare policy).
224 See Edwards supra note 220 (“[T]he reasonable efforts/no reasonable
efforts findings are the most powerful tools given to the courts by the federal
legislation.”).
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engage in a meaningful analysis when making a finding—and that
will require parent advocates to litigate.225
Obviously, a full hearing before a judge, where each party is
competently represented, provides the highest level of protection
against unnecessary removals.226 However, there are times when the
danger to a child is known, but not so immediate that a state agency
must remove a child without a warrant. In these situations, state
agencies may seek an ex parte authorization for an emergency
removal.227 Although the parent in an ex parte proceeding is
deprived the protections of counsel and an opportunity to
immediately challenge a removal, judicial review—even in an ex
parte setting—provides some means of supervision of a state
agency’s discretion.228
Accordingly, in keeping with the “reasonable efforts”
requirement for federal Title IV-E funding, Congress should enact
language that requires judges to make a finding that there was no
time or ability for the state to seek a court order prior to removal of
the child. If a judge finds that a child protective agency could have
sought a court order—ex parte or otherwise—prior to removal, then
a court should find that case ineligible for Title IV-E funds because
no “reasonable efforts” were made.229 Additionally, given the
imbalance of information in court between a parent and the state
after a state agency effectuates an emergency removal, it should be
the child protective agency’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate
facts and circumstances that the narrow emergency removal
exception was met and that the imminent risk to the child was so
immediate that there was no time to seek judicial review.
The solutions proposed herein would also help protect children
and ensure that their reciprocal rights to family integrity are upheld.
Federal mandates that heighten the burden on child welfare agencies
seeking to conduct an emergency removal without a court order
225 Id. (arguing that advocates must litigate the issue of reasonable efforts for
the tool to be effective).
226 See Claire Chiamulera, Representing Parents in Child Welfare Cases—
Inside the Book with Martin Guggenheim and Vivek Sankaran, 35 CHILDS. L.
PRAC. 14 (2016) (discussing how effective parental representation helps children).
227 See discussion supra Part II.
228 See discussion supra Part II.
229 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).
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comport with current federal child welfare policy goals of
preventing unnecessary removals.230 Past federal legislation has
recognized that preventative services and alternatives to removal
often can protect a child without putting a child through the trauma
of removal from the home.231 The federal government has also
acknowledged many of the criticisms and potential harms leveled at
the child welfare system, including racial biases, the punishing of
poor parents, and a general lack of training and expertise among
caseworkers armed with wide discretion.232 Codifying an
emergency removal exception that minimizes the discretion of
caseworkers would be a meaningful and useful next step in
reforming the child welfare system to support families and better
protect children.
A determination that reasonable efforts have been made to
prevent the removal of a child is essential to prevent unnecessary
family separations.233 A court’s determination about reasonable
efforts, coupled with the financial incentive tied to that finding,
provides a critical opportunity to check state agency decision
making.234 Ensuring that emergency removals without a court order
only occur in truly exigent circumstances, where a state has made
meaningful reasonable efforts to avoid the removal, is not only
essential in protecting a family’s constitutional right to be free from
unnecessary state intervention—it is a productive step in carrying
out the federal goal of promoting family support and unity.
230 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., supra note 190 at 1–6.
231 See Family First Prevention Services Act, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat.
232 (2018) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(1)) (enabling Title IV-E
funds to also go towards preventative services that help “candidates for foster
care” stay with parents or other kin where previously they could only be used to
pay foster care costs).
232 See AFCARS Report #24, CHILDS. BUREAU (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/resource/afcars-report-24 (finding that for vulnerable
families, common problems such as limited or loss of income, inadequate
housing, or civil legal issues, if left unattended, can escalate to crisis and lead to
formal child welfare system involvement. Neglect was present at the time of
removal for over 60 percent of children who entered foster care in 2016).
233 Reasonable Efforts to Preserve or Reunify Families and Achieve
Permanency for Children, CHILDS. BUREAU (Mar. 2016), https://
www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/reunify.pdf.
234 Id.
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CONCLUSION
The unchecked discretion of child protective agencies, vaguely
written laws, and a woeful lack of procedural protections in family
proceedings have kept innocent families in and out of court and
subject to monitoring by state agencies for years.235 Indeed, child
welfare systems’ disproportionate and rampant punishment of poor
families of color in the United States have earned them the scathing
nickname “Jane Crow.”236 Emergency removals without a court
order represent the apex of state power to intrude on family
integrity.237 Without a federal standard to resolve a split among the
circuits that reaffirms the rights and due process protections that
families deserve, inconsistencies in practices across states continue.
As long as state child welfare agencies go unchecked, unnecessary
removals will continue to harm parents, children, and the family unit
alike.238 The threat of unchecked state power in this area has been
thoroughly researched and documented.239 Now it must be
addressed.
235 Clifford & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 75.
236 Id.
237 SeeDiane Redleaf,When the Child Protective Services System Gets Child
Removal Wrong, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.cato-
unbound.org/2018/11/09/diane-redleaf/when-child-protective-services-system-
gets-child-removal-wrong (discussing the policies and methods of family
separations in the United States).
238 See discussion supra Part III.
239 See Friedersdorf, supra note 13.
